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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Big Brand Name develops and files a patent for a drug that kills
bacteria in an innovative way. The drug is groundbreaking and potentially
marketable, so Big Brand Name incurs the enormous cost (estimated at
$868 million) and time of drug discovery research and safety
determinations of clinical trials to bring the drug to market. 1 Small
Generic Company wants to sell the same drug but must wait until Big
Brand Name’s patent expires or, in the alternative, Small Generic
Company can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with
the FDA and allege Big Brand Name’s patent is invalid or the patent does
not cover Small Generic Company’s Drug. 2 Filing an ANDA application
is an attractive option for Small Generic Company because it can market
and sell the same drug for a fraction of Big Brand Name’s development

* Scott Bergeson is a patent agent with a chemical engineering background and recent
graduate of the University of Richmond School of Law. He would like to thank
Professor Kristen Osenga for her invaluable guidance in publishing this article.
1

See Christopher Adams & Van Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is it Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420, 420, 424 (2006).

2

See Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act,
9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2004).
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and clinical trial cost. 3 Thus, Small Generic Company files an ANDA
application, stating the relevant patent (Big Brand Name’s patent) is
invalid or their drug does not infringe the relevant patent. 4 The ANDA
application allows Small Generic Company to bypass the expensive
clinical trials. 5
[2]
The ANDA application filed by Small Generic Company provides
Big Brand Name with standing to sue for patent infringement. 6 Big Brand
Name files suit. 7 Small Generic Company files a counter-claim asserting
Big Brand Name’s patent is invalid. Instead of risking Big Brand Name’s
patent and loss of its temporary monopoly on the drug and the
accompanying large profits, Big Brand Name pays Small Generic
Company nearly $400 million to drop their invalidity counter-claim and
refrain from entering the market. 8 Big Brand Name would rather share
some of its monopoly profits with Small Generic Company and keep
competition at bay than risk the invalidity of its patent and the end of its
monopoly profits. Interestingly, Small Generic Company may have only
earned $200 million from marketing and selling the drug on its own. 9
3

See id. at 6.

4

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006); see, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

5

See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, 5
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
6

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).

7

If Big Brand Name does not file suit within forty-five days of the ANDA filing date,
then Big Brand Name does not trigger the 30-month stay provision preventing FDA
approval of Small Generic’s ANDA application. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2006).
8

See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG,
131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 *7-8; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544
F.3d at 1329 & n.5.
9

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct 1606
(No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 *7-8.
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Therefore, Small Generic Company earned $298 million more by settling
than it could from selling the drug. 10
[3]
This can result in an interesting predicamenta generic
pharmaceutical company obtaining more money from a lawsuit settlement
than the same company could stand to earn from manufacturing and
selling the drug. 11 Scholars and practitioners call this a reverse payment
because Big Brand Name originally sued Small Generic Company as the
plaintiff. 12 In most litigation settlements, the defendant pays the plaintiff
to drop the suit. 13 This is the reverse situation—the plaintiff, Big Brand
Name, pays the defendant, Small Generic Company, to drop the counterclaim. 14 As part of the settlement, the generic company agrees to not enter
the market with the drug until the brand name company’s patent expires. 15
[4]
This type of settlement is troubling because Congress’s purpose in
enacting the ANDA legislation was to encourage competition in the
pharmaceutical realm, not stifle it. 16 Generic drug companies are market
competitors with brand name drug companies in the pharmaceutical
10

See id.

11

See id.

12

See Christopher Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494 (2007) (defining reverse
payments as “a variety of diverse patent settlement agreements that involve a transfer of
consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer . . . [T]he patent owner
agrees to provide some compensation to the alleged infringer, and the alleged infringer
agrees to delay developing or marketing a product”).
13

See id.

14

See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328–29
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the patent owner paid the alleged infringer and generic
company $398.1 million to drop its counter-claim and delay entry into the market).
15

See id.

16

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647–48.
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market. Generic companies must enter the market to compete. Congress
tried to encourage more generic companies to enter the market by
providing two significant incentives: a faster approval system for
pharmaceutical competitors marketing previously approved FDA drugs 17
and the reward of a temporary monopoly to the first generic filer that
challenges a bad patent through this faster filing process. 18 However,
Congress’s competitive purpose is thwarted by the reverse payment
settlements because it involves generic companies agreeing to not enter
the market. Worst yet, when reverse payments are combined with the
180-day exclusivity provision, other potential competitors are prevented
from entering the market. 19
[5]
This article identifies two problems with reverse payment
settlements. One problem stems from Congress’s well-intended, but
incomplete, incentives from the Hatch-Waxman Act. 20 One incentive
intended to encourage competition between brand name companies and
generic companies may actually prevent competition when companies
enter reverse payment agreements. The second problem is with the courts’
analyses of reverse payment agreements. The courts’ analyses of reverse
payment agreements are inconsistent, and some are misguided. 21

17

Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006) (explaining that a drug under the new drug
application must show, among many other things, full reports of investigations whether
the drug is safe and effective), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (stating that a drug under
the abbreviated new drug application must show that it has the same active ingredient as
a previously approved drug).

18

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(b)(iv).

19

See Holman, supra note 12, at 494.

20

See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 947–48 (2011)
(describing why the Hatch-Waxman Act’s quasi-exclusive rights are insufficient
incentives for holders of generic patents).
21

See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) (this
author believes that the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the plaintiff’s decision to enter into a
reverse payment agreement means the patent is per se invalid is not the right
determination or analysis for reverse payment cases).
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[6]
To ensure that the proper balance of competition and innovation
thrives in the pharmaceutical industry, Congress must address both
problems. Congress must amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide
proper incentives to qualifying generic companies, which would prevent
many reverse payments from forming. Specifically, Congress needs to
reward a second generic patent challenger with a temporary monopoly
incentive if the first fails to utilize the incentive. In addition, Congress
must detail a uniform reverse payment agreement analysis to properly
determine whether reverse payment agreements are anticompetitive.
Without an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act removing an
unintended approval roadblock for generic drug competitors, many
anticompetitive reverse payment agreements will continue to form.
Without a proper uniform ex post court analysis, courts cannot
appropriately police the reverse payment agreements that are
anticompetitive. Thus, Congress must fix both.
[7]
Section II describes the balance Congress struck between
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically,
this section describes the two Hatch-Waxman incentives aimed at
encouraging competition and making available lower price drugs. Section
III explains how companies enter reverse payment agreements and how
these agreements undermine Congress’s balancing act. Section IV
examines how courts have analyzed the anticompetitive nature of reverse
payments. Of the three primary modes, one court’s reasoning is the most
sound. However, even a proper court analysis or a new Senate bill
codifying this analysis is ineffective alone in preventing anticompetitive
reverse payments from forming. Section V proposes a legislative
amendment to the 180-day exclusivity incentive for Congress to
discourage companies from forming anticompetitive reverse payment
agreements to start with. Only when Congress combines the amendment
with the proper ex post analyses of these agreements by the courts can we
have an effective solution to ensure the agreements are not
anticompetitive.
II. CONGRESS’S DELICATE BALANCE: HATCH-WAXMAN INCENTIVES TO
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
5

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Volume XVIII, Issue 4
[8]
Congress believes that consumers need innovation delicately
balanced with competition in the pharmaceutical industry because both are
important. 22 Competition is needed to help reduce drug prices for
consumers. 23 Innovation is needed to create new life saving drugs. 24
Unfortunately, without proper incentives, competition will take
precedence at the expense of innovation, or vice versa. Competition in the
pharmaceutical industry creates lower priced drugs, but it comes at the
cost of less innovation. 25 Too much competition would stifle innovation
and starve the world of new life saving drugs. 26 However, a lack of
competition between drug companies would keep drug prices high,
thereby making them inaccessible to many who need them the most. 27
[9]
Recognizing this, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to
encourage competition in pharmaceuticals without sacrificing
innovation. 28 The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages innovation by allowing
patent holders to extend the life of their patent monopoly beyond the

22

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647–48; Holman, supra note 12, at 513.
23

See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 9.

24

Albert Wertheimer &Thomas Santella, The History and Economics of Pharmaceutical
Patents, in 16 RESEARCH IN HUMAN CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT, THE VALUE OF
INNOVATION: IMPACT OF HEALTH, LIFE QUALITY, SAFETY, AND REGULATORY RESEARCH
101, 102 (Irina Farquhar et al. eds., 2008).
25

See Carmelo Giaccotto, Rexford Santerre & John Vernon, Drug Prices and Research
and Development Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. & ECON.
195, 212 (2005).
26

See id.

27

See Patricia Danzon, Making Sense of Drug Prices, 23 REGULATION 56, 58 (2006),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n1/danzon.pdf.

28

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647
(describing the purpose of the bill is to increase the number of generic drug); id. at 39
(explaining that new and important innovation should be rewarded).
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normal patent life of twenty years. 29 The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages
competition by creating a less expensive FDA approval process for
generic drugs, 30 and providing the first generic patent challenger with a
first mover advantage against other generics. 31 However, when Congress
created the incentives to balance innovation and competition they failed to
realize that the incentives encouraged pharmaceutical companies to enter
into reverse payment agreements. 32 These reverse payment agreements
between patent-holding pharmaceutical companies and ANDA filers upset
Congress’s competition-innovation balance. 33 One incentive, in particular
the 180-day exclusivity, established a roadblock to the very competition
that Congress intended to create. 34
A. Innovation versus Competition
[10] Competition encourages lower prices for medicine, but in the
pharmaceutical industry, it may decrease innovation. 35 The first company
to create a new drug and file for a patent has a competitive advantage due
to the inherent monopoly rights granted with the patent. 36 A second
company, or generic company, invests a smaller amount of money than
29

35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).

30

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).

31

See id; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (providing the first generic patent challenger
with a 180-day exclusivity against other generics).
32

See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 947-48. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 98857(I), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
33

See Holman, supra note 12, at 506.

34

Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 947-48.

35

See Giaccotto, Santerre & Vernon, supra note 25, at 212.

36

See Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, PATENT
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 12-14 (2005).
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the first, by copying the first company’s drug through the ANDA
process. 37 Therefore, the generic company can sell the same drug at a
lower, but still profitable, price. A generic company’s substantially lower
drug development costs leads to an increase in the number of generic
competitors in the market. 38 As generic competitors enter the market, the
inventing company’s market share declines resulting in fewer profits. 39
Because the inventing company makes fewer profits, it has less of an
incentive to continue inventing new drugs, decreasing innovation. 40
[11] Some commentators note, however, that companies with an
established market presence have no incentive to truly innovate and
instead pool resources to maintain their market dominance. 41 Thomas
Piraino wrote that some economic studies show monopolists conduct less
research and innovation than companies in competitive markets. 42
However, in the same article he states that economic studies conclude that
competition in innovation is “more critical to long-term economic
efficiency than is price competition.” 43 He notes that continuous
37

See Holman, supra note 12, at 511.

38

See id. at 510–11.

39

See id; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
40

See CBO, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45,
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf; see, e.g., F.
M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1993).
41

See Thomas Piraino, Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 814-15 (2000); Douglass Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and
Technological Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635, 649 (1979); Mark Green, Have the
Antitrust Law Promised Too Much and Accomplished Too Little? Answer: Yes, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 752, 755 (1977).
42

See Piraino, supra note 41, at 815.

43

Id.
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innovation is important because it decreases prices of goods and expands
the number of goods for consumers. 44 He provides the example of
Microsoft, which used its market dominance to stifle innovation in
operating systems and other similar software. 45
[12] As Mr. Piraino states innovation provides more benefits to the
market than price competition. 46 Mr. Piraino admits that innovation is
more critical than price competition. 47 He is merely worried about
companies who sit on their innovations without contributing to new
ones. 48 He specifies that continued innovation is the highest level of
importance to consumers because it increases the number of new products
on the market. 49 Our market system should favor innovation because
gains from innovation can be significantly greater than gains from
competition. 50 Innovation can create jobs, new industries, and new
products. 51 Patents encourage innovation and should be favored over
44

See id.

45

See id.

46

See id.

47

Piraino, supra note 41 at 815.

48

See id.

49

See id.

50

See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
761, 833 (2002); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1035, 1045 (2000); Neelie Kroes, Op-Ed, Why Microsoft Was Wrong, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Sept. 26, 2007 at 13 (“Where a well-established monopolist exploits its position to
colonize neighboring markets, this can scare investors from funding competitors,
undermine the incentive and ability of those competitors to invest and innovate, and drive
out competitors who are as efficient as the monopolist. And monopolists exploiting their
strategic position to conquer new markets are less likely to innovate than companies
forced to compete for customers on the basis of the merits of their products.”).
51

See A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving Towards Sustainable Growth and
Quality Jobs, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnovation.

9
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competition. 52 In addition to the benefits of innovation over competition,
in medicine, innovation can save lives. 53 Thus, when balancing is not an
option, Congress should err on the side of over-rewarding innovation. 54
B. Hatch-Waxman Incentives for Generics
[13] The Hatch-Waxman Act provides, among other things, two
incentives to generic drug manufacturers to compete with brand name
manufacturers. 55 First, the Act creates the ANDA process, which permits
generic manufacturers to forgo the onerous clinic trials required in typical
new drug applications if the generic manufacturer can show the FDA its
drug is bioequivalent to an existing approved drug. 56 Second, the Act
provides a temporary 180-day monopoly to the first generic manufacturer
to file an application challenging the brand name manufacturer’s patent
through the ANDA process. 57

52

But see Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (“[I]n patent law, the purpose is to encourage innovation while inviting
competition; the recipient of a patent is granted a monopoly for a limited time, after
which the innovation passes to the public for copying and improvement.”).
53

See Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., (U.S.
2011) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373698 at *22.
54

See id. at *23 (describing pharmaceutical patents as “critical to spurring innovation that
will save or improve countless lives. . . . [w]ithout the promise of protection that will
enable recoupment of the enormous investment that goes into development of these
processes, the development will not be undertaken”).

55

See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) (providing the ways in which abbreviated
applications may be filed).

56

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iv).

57

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (defining the 180 day exclusivity period and
explaining that the Secretary shall approve or disprove an application within 180 days).
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1. A Shorter Process: The Abbreviated New Drug
Application
[14] One way Congress encourages competition is through the ANDA
process. 58 Rather than going through the full-length approval process,
generics can rely on brand names’ approval and enter the market quickly
and cheaper than their brand name counter parts. 59 This is obviously
enticing for the competing drug companies because they can charge a
lower price for a drug than the brand name and still earn a profit.
[15] A brand name must incur a high cost for drug development and
approval and thus has to charge a high price to obtain a return on its
investment. 60 First, the brand name spends money on discovering a
drug. 61 Then brand name spends money on filing for a patent on the
drug. 62 Then the company undergoes expensive clinical trials for the new
drug as required by the FDA. 63
[16] A patent holder likely files for a patent once the drug is
discovered. 64 Once discovered, the patent holder must undergo arduous
clinic trials to ensure that the drug is effective and safe for human
consumption. 65 The FDA regulates and requires clinical trials as a part of
58

See Holman, supra note 12, at 510.

59

See id. at 510-11.

60

See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4.

61

See id.

62

See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006) (explaining the contents of a drug patent
application).

63

See id.

64

See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4.

65

See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2006) (describing the FDA’s review
requirements).
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the new drug application (“NDA”) process and requires many years to
complete the testing. 66 After the research, clinical trials, and full FDA
approval, the brand name places the drug on the market using its patent to
exploit its monopoly with higher prices to recoup investment costs.
[17] In contrast, the ANDA filer has a shorter, less expensive route to
market. 67 The ANDA filer does not have to perform research and
development to discover the drug nor does the ANDA filer need to
perform clinic trials to show the drug is safe and effective. 68 The ANDA
filer may instead copy the patent holder’s drug, show that the new drug is
the same as the patent holder’s, and file an ANDA application. 69 In the
ANDA application, the ANDA filer claims that their drug is bioequivalent
to the patent holder’s drug. 70 A company may show a drug is
bioequivalent if it has the same active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”)
as an already FDA approved drug. 71 The FDA approves an ANDA
application in a short period because the patented drug already underwent
studies to ensure it is safe and effective; the ANDA filer simply must
show the FDA that its drug is the same. 72 This shorter and less expensive
process allows the ANDA filer to sell the same drug as the patent holder
for a lower price because the ANDA filer incurred much lower costs to get
to market.
2. The 180-Day Exclusivity Period
66

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).

67

See NPS, Generic Medicines: Informing Patients About Multiple Brands,
http://www.nps.org.au/health_professionals/publications/nps_news/current/generic_medi
cines_informing_patients (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
68

See Holman, supra note 12, at 511.

69

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).

70

See 21 U.S.C.§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).

71

See id.

72

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(viii).
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[18] Congress also provided a temporary monetary incentive through a
first mover advantage to encourage competition, but only to an ANDA
filer that challenges a patent. 73 An ANDA filer must make one of four
certifications with respect to any related patents on the drug: (I) the related
patent has not been filed on the drug; (II) the related patent has expired;
(III) the related patent will expire soon; or, (IV) the related patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the new drug. 74 This framework
rewards the ANDA filer that makes the fourth certification to encourage
generic companies to compete with brand name companies by challenging
the latter’s patents.
[19] Congress grants the first ANDA filer making a paragraph (IV)
certification with a 180-day exclusivity period, making it the only generic
seller of the drug. 75 The first ANDA challenger is the only generic
company in the market for a small period allowing it to maintain a high
price and earning a high return on its drug manufacturing costs. 76 It is not
until the second generic drug enters market that major price erosion
begins. 77 In addition to the high short-term return on investment, the 180day exclusivity rewards the first ANDA challenger with the first mover
advantage. 78 This provides the challenger with the ability to establish
itself in the marketplace, leading to more revenue opportunities for the
generic company as the preferred generic alternative to consumers. 79
73

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).

74

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)-(iv).

75

See id.

76

See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 39.

77

See id.

78

Aidan Hollis, The Importance of Being First: Evidence From Canadian Generic
Pharmaceuticals, 11 HEALTH ECON. 723, 732-33 (2002).
79

Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 44 (1988) (explaining that the first mover is able to preempt
rivals to scarcities such as the shelf space in a pharmacy).
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III. HOW CONGRESS GOT SICK: REVERSE PAYMENTS
[20] Through the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress tried to balance
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry, reverse
payments upset this balance. 80 Congress did not anticipate reverse
payment agreements when drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly
concerning its competitive incentives such as the 180-day exclusivity for
the first ANDA challenger. 81 Thus, unexpected consequences occurred.
When these unique agreements combine with the 180-day exclusivity
incentive it actually hinders competition instead of encourage it as
Congress originally intended.
[21] Reverse payment agreements result from a unique situation
between a patent holder and a generic company. First, a brand name drug
company discovers a new drug and files for a patent and for FDA
approval. 82 The drug company receives a patent and eventually FDA
approval. 83 The drug company and now patent holder sells the drug for a
high price because of the large cost the patent holder had to incur in
discovering the drug and seeking FDA approval through the new drug
application. 84 Eventually a generic drug company decides to make the
80

See also William H. Rooney & Elai Katz et al., Review of Reverse-Payment
Agreements: The Agencies, the Courts, Congress, and the European Commission, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 122, 122 (Apr. 17, 2012, 7:45 PM), available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/review-of-reverse-payment-agreementsthe-agencies-the-courts-congress-and-the-european-commission/
See generally H.R.
REP. NO. 98-857(I), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
81

See generally Rooney & Katz et al., supra note 80 (describing how the Hatch-Waxman
Act intended to foster innovation but resulted in the creation of reverse-payment
agreements).
82

See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4.

83

See id. at 5.

84

See generally Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 951 (describing the testing and
approval process required for the FDA is expensive and time consuming).
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exact drug as the patent holder. 85 Since the drug is not new, the generic
company files an ANDA to obtain FDA approval. 86 The ANDA filer
must make a certified statement regarding why their drug will not affect
related patents including the patent holder’s. 87 The ANDA filer may state
the related patent is invalid or that it does not infringe the related patent—
a paragraph (IV) certification. 88 This provides the patent holder with a
cause of action to sue the ANDA filer for patent infringement. 89 Once
sued, the ANDA filer will typically assert a counter-claim stating the
patent is invalid. 90 Instead of risking a judgment against that patent
holder, invalidating or narrowing the patent’s scope, the patent holder
settles with the ANDA filer. 91 The patent holder has a larger risk—the
end of highly lucrative monopoly profits—thus pays the ANDA filer to
end litigation and refrain from entering the market with their generic
drug. 92 Because the patentee pays the infringer to settle the lawsuit, this is
called a reverse payment. 93
[22] When the reverse payment is combined with the 180-day
exclusivity incentive, a bottleneck for subsequent ANDA filers is formed
and competition is hindered. The 180-day exclusivity hinders competition

85

See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4.

86

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4.

87

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).

88

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).

89

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).

90

See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
91

See id.

92

See id. at 1329.

93

See id..
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if the first ANDA challenger does not execute its exclusivity. 94
Competition is hindered because the FDA will not grant subsequent filers
approval until the first ANDA challenger uses the 180-day exclusivity
period. 95 This delay in approval discourages subsequent filers from filing
an ANDA application or marketing a drug. 96 The 180-day exclusivity is
triggered when the first ANDA challenger markets the drug. 97 Thus,
when the ANDA challenger agrees to delay marketing in a reverse
payment agreement, the challenger delays the start of the exclusivity
period. 98 This delay blocks other generics from entering the marketplace
until 180-days after the challenger begins to market the generic drug. 99
Through the agreement, the first ANDA challenger collects money from
the patent holder and utilizes the 180-day exclusivity after the agreement
concludes. 100 This works great for the first ANDA challenger because it is
able to collect a large sum of money without entering the market. 101 In
addition, once the agreement ends—usually many years later—the ANDA
challenger may reap the benefits of the 180-day exclusivity period as a
second payday.

94

See Shashank Upadhye, Triggering the 180-Day Exclusivity Clock Under the PostMMA Rules, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA LAW, Feb. 2012, at § 13.9,
available at WL GENPHARMA § 13:9.
95

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).

96

If a potential subsequent generic filer learns that a prior generic has an exclusivity
period that could be prevent the subsequent filer from FDA approval for an unknown
period, the subsequent filer would likely forgo investment in that drug for another.

97

See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13:9.

98

See id.

99

See id.

100

See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 948.

101

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG,
131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 at *7-8.
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[23] Subsequent ANDA-filing generic drug companies have fewer
incentives or no incentives because of the bottleneck to enter the market.
Congress only provides the 180-day exclusivity provision to the first
ANDA filer making a paragraph (IV) certification, regardless of whether
or when the first filer utilizes the incentive. 102 Later ANDA filers do not
have the benefit of the 180-day exclusivity and are, in fact, prevented from
obtaining FDA approval until the first ANDA filer exercises its 180-day
exclusivity right. 103 The main incentive for subsequent generic companies
is the faster ANDA process, compared to the new drug application
process. 104 However, even this incentive is unavailable if a previous filer
has the right to 180-day exclusivity. 105 Without the first mover benefit
and more importantly the delay of FDA approval due to prior filers with
the 180-day exclusivity, subsequent filers have less incentives and a
higher risk to enter the market.
IV. TREATING THE SYMPTOMS: CURRENT APPROACHES
[24] Courts do not agree whether reverse payment agreements are
anticompetitive and illegal, causing uncertainty about the validity of the
agreements. 106 Three different analyses have emerged. 107 The Sixth
Circuit views a reverse payment as evidence that a patent is not strong
enough for the patent holder to exclude others, and thus, is per se
anticompetitive. 108 The Second Circuit relies on the presumption that a
102

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).

103

See id.

104

See id.

105

See id.

106

See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2005); In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
107

See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13; In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915; Valley
Drug, 344 F.3d at 1313.
108

See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915.

17

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Volume XVIII, Issue 4
patent is valid unless fraud was committed on the patent office. 109
Because reverse payment agreements are based around the exclusionary
right of a patent, they are presumptively valid and not anti-competitive. 110
The Eleventh Circuit uses a two-step process. 111 The court determines the
scope and strength of the disputed patent first and then analyzes whether
the reverse payment settlement is anticompetitive based on the patent. 112
[25] Congress needs to supply the courts with the best approach. Once
the ANDA filer and patent holder reached an agreement, following an
ANDA initiated patent infringement suit, the companies depend and plan
future investments based on the agreement. Companies cannot plan for
the uncertainty surrounding validity of these agreements since the courts
do not agree on which type of reverse payments are valid. Companies are
hesitant to invest in innovation when they have uncertainties in a
significant portion of their budgets. 113
A. Reverse Payments are Per Se Anticompetitive
[26] The Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation held
that the reverse payment agreement at issue was anticompetitive and per
se illegal. 114 The court determined that it must consider the strength of
the patent when considering whether the reverse payment agreement is
anticompetitive. 115 The court reasoned that if the brand name’s patent
109

In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13.

110

See id.

111

Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1313.

112

Id.

113

See Samuel Brittan, Question 1: Recovery, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ab493aa2-353e-11e1-a4ab00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iLiTIsAX.
114

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003).

115

See id. at 915.
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were strong enough then it would not have paid the generic company to
stay out of the market when the patent alone could have accomplished the
same. 116 Thus, the court ruled that the reverse payment, of nearly ninety
million dollars, was so anticompetitive, it was per se illegal. 117 The court
also noted the agreement was anticompetitive because the ANDA filer
held onto the 180-day exclusivity benefit without ending litigation
between the companies. 118 This prevented subsequent ANDA filers from
obtaining FDA approval. 119 Without FDA approval, other generic
companies could not enter the same drug market and led the court to
determine the agreement was anticompetitive. 120
[27] The Sixth Circuit properly recognized a problem with reverse
payment agreements, but erred in their analysis on why the agreements are
anticompetitive. The court, noticing the anticompetitive nature of the
agreement, created a presumption that reverse payment agreements are per
se anticompetitive because the patent holder made a payment to the
generic to delay its market entry. 121 The court was correct to find the
agreement anticompetitive, but only because litigation between the
companies continued. 122 The continued litigation allows the generic
company to hold onto the 180-day exclusivity, preventing additional
generic companies from entering the market. 123 Because at that time a
court decision triggered the 180-day exclusivity, and a reverse payment
116

See id.

117

See id. at 905.

118

See id. at 907 n.12, 908.

119

See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907 n. 12, 908.

120

See id.

121

See id. at 910.

122

See id. at 907 & n.12.

123

See id.
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agreement with continuing litigation prevented all other generic
companies from entering the market. 124
B.
Reverse Payments are Presumed Valid and Not
Anticompetitive
[28] Expressly rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, the Second Circuit
in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation held that a reverse payment
agreement is presumed valid and not anticompetitive. 125 The court
reasoned patent holders have a lawful monopoly and thus no competition
would result between the companies because of the patent. 126 The court
presumed the reverse payment was not anticompetitive unless the patent
was obtained through fraud or sham on the patent office. 127 The court also
determined that the presumption may be overcome if the agreement
extends beyond the exclusionary scope of the patent at issue. 128 Here, the
settlement agreement between the patent holder and the ANDA filer ended
the ongoing litigation and did not extend beyond the life of the patent. 129
Thus, the agreement was presume not to violate antitrust laws. 130
[29] The Second Circuit places a high priority on a patent’s
presumption of validity without addressing the scope of the patent. 131 The
Second Circuit bases the presumption that the reverse payment agreements
are not anticompetitive because a patent is involved and patents are
124

See In re Cardizem, 332 F. 3d at 907 & n.12.

125

In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006).

126

Id. at 212-13.
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See id.
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Id. at 213.
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See id..

130

See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 218.

131

See id. at 211.
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presumed valid. 132 The problem is that a patent’s claim may be valid but
too narrow to exclude a particular product. 133 To determine whether the
patent covers the generic drug, the court must define the claim, determine
scope of the claim, and find whether the generic drug infringes the
claim. 134 This is the only way to determine if the reverse payment
agreement is a lawful extension of the patent. The court must move
through the patent claim construction before deciding the anticompetitive
nature of the agreement.
C. Look to the Patent’s Exclusionary Scope First
[30] The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. reversed a district court’s holding that a reverse
payment agreement was per se anticompetitive. 135 The court remanded
the district court to incorporate in the anticompetitive analysis a patent
holder’s rights and protections granted by the constitution. 136 The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that reverse payment agreements are not per se
anticompetitive, so long as the agreement is not broader than the
exclusionary effects of the disputed patent. 137 The court recognized that
patents are a general exception to antitrust liability, but the exception is
limited to the scope of the patent. 138 The Eleventh Circuit instructed the
132

See id.

133

21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006) (certifying that the related patent is invalid or the
generic drug will not infringe the related patent). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)
(discussing patent infringement).
134

See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13 (stating that competition can only be
restrained “within the scope of the patent”, implying that the scope of both patents needs
to be examined to determine infringement).

135

See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

136

See id. at 1312.

137

See id. at 1309.

138

See id. at 1312.
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lower court to analyze the scope of the disputed patents before
determining the anticompetitive nature of the agreement. 139 Once a court
determines the metes and bound of the patent, the court can determine
whether the settlement agreement extends beyond it. 140 On remand, the
lower court addressed the exclusionary scope of the patent and found that
the agreement was per se illegal because the patent was likely invalid. 141
[31] Congress should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. It properly
takes into account the legal monopolistic effects of patents, without over
emphasis on the presumed validity or scope of the patents. The Sixth
Circuit is at one extremeit assumes that a payment from a patent holder
to a generic company to delay entry is proof that the patent alone is not
strong enough to exclude the drug. 142 The Second Circuit is at the
opposite end of the spectrumit assumes that the patent is valid and that
its scope covers the drug unless fraud was committed on the patent
office. 143 The Second Circuit relies on the presumption of a patent’s
validity without determining the scope of the patent claims. 144 The
Eleventh Circuit takes the middle-ground approach by determining the
scope and validity of the patent at issue and using it to determine whether
the reverse payment agreement is a lawful extension of the patent. 145 In
analyzing these agreements, Congress should adopt the Eleventh Circuit
approach for similar determinations because it properly takes a patent’s
exclusionary effect without giving over emphasis to its presumed validity
of the its scope.
139

See id.

140

See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312-13.

141

See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298, 1306–
07 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2005).
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See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312-13.
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[32] A proper analysis helps courts determine whether the reverse
payment is anticompetitive once entered into, but does not prevent them
from occurring. Pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to create these
agreements and delay subsequent ANDA filers from entering the market
remain. Patent holders still have an incentive to retain monopoly profits
and pay generic companies to postpone entry in the market. Generic
companies have an incentive to collect money from the patent holder to
retain more money than companies would manufacturing and selling the
generic drug. Because two parties to the underlying suit have the same
objective—keeping the reverse payment agreement intact—Congress
needs take the initiative to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to discourage
future anticompetitive agreements.
D. Senate Bill S. 27 Addresses the Symptoms Instead of the
Sickness
[33] Congress’s recent proposal falls short of addressing the real issue
with reverse payment agreements: the misbalanced incentives in the
Hatch-Waxman Act. In addition, the bill attempts to codify an incorrect
analysis in determining whether the agreements are anticompetitive. As a
first priority, Congress should focus its efforts on correcting and amending
the incentives in the Hatch-Waxman Act to discourage anticompetitive
reverse payment agreement from forming by amending the 180-day
exclusivity provision. As a second priority, Congress should mandate how
courts analyze the anticompetitive nature of the agreement.
[34] Congress needs to change the incentive encouraging generics to
challenge brand name patents. The 180-day exclusivity provides this
incentive, but when combined with a reverse payment acts as a blockade
to additional generic companies entering the market. The first ANDA
challenger may prevent other generics from obtaining FDA approval until
the ANDA challenger markets its drug. 146 The reverse payment delays the
generic’s market entry, the 180-day trigger, and thus all other generics are
146

See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13:9.
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prevented from entry until 180-days after the ANDA challenger’s
exclusivity period begins. 147 As discussed in the next section, Congress
can by creating an additional triggering event—entering into a reverse
payment—to encourage generics to challenge brand patents without
blocking all generic competition. This would effectively prevent reverse
payment agreements from forming.
[35] Congress, in Senate Bill S.27, proposes a new process for
analyzing reverse payment agreements. 148 The bill creates a presumption
that reverse-payment agreements are anticompetitive. 149 The bill grants
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) the ability to police these
agreements with its own proceedings using this presumption. 150 To
overcome the presumption, the parties to the agreement must show the
agreement has more beneficial effects than harmful anticompetitive
effects. 151 The parties must prove this by a clear and convincing
standard. 152
[36] The bill proposes an incorrect anticompetitive determination. The
bill’s analysis and presumption is almost identical to the Sixth Circuit’s
presumption against the agreements. 153
It disregards the legal
147

See Ankur N. Patel, Delayed Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment on the HatchWaxman Act and the “Approval Bottleneck,” 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1095 (2009).
148

See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf.
149

See id. (explaining that an agreement is presumed anticompetitive if the ANDA filer
receives anything of value and agrees to limit research or other necessary steps to get the
drug to market).
150

See id.
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See id.

152

See id.
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Compare Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a)
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS112s27rs.pdf, with In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
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exclusionary scope of disputed patents. 154 Patents provide the owner the
ability to exclude others from making, using, or selling a product covered
by the patent. 155 This is an express exception to antitrust laws granted by
the Constitution and must be incorporated into the analysis. 156
[37] Congress should follow the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. The
Eleventh Circuit looked at the exclusionary effects of disputed patents
before determining whether a reverse payment agreement is
anticompetitive. 157 The court reasoned that a patent is a constitutional
exception to antitrust law. 158 A patent holder may exclude others from the
market so long as their patent rightfully grants the right. 159 Here, the bill
unconstitutionally ignores a patent holder’s rights by creating a
presumption against reverse payment agreements. 160 Congress should
remove the presumption against reverse payment agreements and look at
the disputed patents first to take into account this express exception to
antitrust laws. In addition, instead of having the FTC making the
determination, Congress should leave it to the courts to decide as an
impartial decision maker unaffected by administration change.
VI. THE VACCINE APPROACH: LONG TERM PREVENTATIVE AND
PROACTIVE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

154

Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf.
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35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
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See id. at 1309.
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See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).

160

See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf.
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[38] To rid consumers of the anticompetitive illness, the courts have to
utilize the proper anticompetitive analysis and Congress must pass
working incentives. Two solutions are proposed. The first proposal
transfers one of Congress’s original competitive incentives to the next inline ANDA filer to encourage competition beyond the first generic
company. The second proposal is for Congress to mandate the Eleventh
Circuit approach to properly analyze whether reverse payment agreements
are anticompetitive.
A. 180-day Exclusivity Pass-Through
[39] Congress originally created the 180-day exclusivity period to
incentivize generic companies to challenge brand name patents by
providing the first mover advantage. 161 However, the 180-day exclusivity
blocks other generic companies from FDA approval until the first generic
filing a paragraph IV certification commercially markets its drug. 162 In
the reverse payment agreement, the generic agrees to delay marketing its
drug preventing it from triggering the 180-day exclusivity. 163 Until the
180-day exclusivity is transferred, all other generics are blocked from
obtaining FDA approval. 164 Only the first generic filing an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification is able to use the right. 165 Thus, Congress
should allow the 180-day exclusivity transfer to the second ANDA filer
upon a triggering event by the first ANDA filer to ensure that generic
competition is not harmed.
[40] Congress should make the 180-day exclusivity incentive
transferrable to the next ANDA filer based on a reverse payment161

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647.
162

See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13.8.
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See id. at § 13.9.
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See id.
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See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (2006).
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triggering event. The current legislation provides the exclusivity only to
the first ANDA filer that makes a paragraph IV certification. 166 Congress
should allow the exclusivity incentive to pass from the first ANDA
challenger to the second ANDA challenger, once the first has entered into
a reverse payment agreement. 167 This would encourage patent holders and
the first ANDA challenger to weigh the cost of entering into reverse
payment agreements against manufacturing the drug without
compromising the competitive generic market. The transfer of the
exclusivity would remove the FDA approval barrier because the second
ANDA challenger now wields the barrier for the other generic’s entry into
the market.
[41] In order to determine whether the 180-day exclusivity has
transferred, Congress must require pharmaceutical companies to register
all reverse payment agreements with the FDA. This will provide notice to
the FDA providing it the ability to inform the next ANDA paragraph IV
challenger of its new rights.
[42] The exclusivity pass-through should transfer only to the first three
paragraph IV ANDA challengers and then open the availability of FDA
approval to all generics. If the second ANDA challenger enters into a
reverse payment agreement, then it would trigger the transfer of the 180day exclusivity to the third ANDA challenger. If the third ANDA
challenger enters into a reverse payment, then the exclusivity would not
transfer, opening the FDA approval roadblock to all subsequent ANDA
filers.
[43] It is important to limit the exclusivity pass-through to the first three
challengers otherwise pass-through exclusivity would act as a continuous
166

See id.

167

See Henry Butler & Jeffrey Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 124 (2010). Mr. Butler and Mr.
Jarosch provided this as an afterthought solution to their article. Here, we will explore
this idea more in depth. Later in this section we will explore this in conjunction with a
proper court analysis of reverse payments.
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blockade. In theory, if the exclusivity pass-through was not limited it
could delay generic competition further. Imagine the 180-day exclusivity
transferring through the first nineteen ANDA challengers because the first
eighteen challengers entered into reverse payment agreements. Each
ANDA challenger would receive the 180-day exclusivity when the ANDA
challenger before it entered into a reverse payment. This would block
generic market from other generics until 180-day after one generic uses
the exclusivity. This could prevent generic market entry longer than the
current process.
[44] Congress has contemplated a similar idea in 2009, but Congress
has yet to approve the proposed bill. 168 The 2009 bill suggested that a
subsequent ANDA challenger may share the exclusivity period with the
first challenger if the subsequent ANDA challenger succeeds in its
challenge against the patent holder. 169 Alternatively, if the patent holder
does not initiate a lawsuit against a subsequent ANDA challenger, then
that ANDA challenger may earn exclusivity. 170
Since multiple
challengers may succeed against the patent holder, multiple challengers
may earn and share the 180-day exclusivity. 171 When multiple companies
share the exclusivity period, the companies lose the first mover advantage
over the entire 180-day period. More importantly, it creates multiple
market participants lowering the price of the drug more than if there were
only the patent holder and one generic in the market. 172 A lower price of
the drug means that the multiple generics earn less than if only one generic
168

See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 166 at 122.
169

See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123.
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See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123.
171

See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123.
172

See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 39.

28

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Volume XVIII, Issue 4
was in the market, which lowers the generics potential profits. 173 This
weakens the generic drug companies’ incentive to challenge the brand
name in the first place. 174
[45] In contrast, the pass-through exclusivity proposal is triggered upon
the first ANDA challenger entering into a reverse payment agreement.
The pass-through exclusivity option ensures only one generic
manufacturer may use the exclusivity period. It allows a generic filer to
reap the maximum benefit from being the sole generic drug in the market
for 180-day period providing it with the ability to sell the generic drug at a
higher price. In addition, it provides the sole generic drug company with
the first mover advantage. The incentive for a generic drug company to
challenge the brand name’s patent must be strong to encourage generic
drugs to file for approval and lower its risk for market entry.
[46] The pass-through proposal provides flexibility to patent holders
and the first ANDA challenger with limited harm to competition. The
solution does not eliminate the ability for brand and generic companies’ to
enter into reverse payment agreements. It provides the companies the
option of using these agreements as effective solutions to their patent
disputes. In addition, Congress would incentivize subsequent generic
filers to enter the market, when previously they were prevented or
discouraged. Previously, if the first ANDA challenger did not use the
180-day exclusivity then neither could a subsequent challenger. The passthrough proposal ensures that the 180-day exclusivity is accessible to other
generics companies if the first does not use it. Since the incentive is
accessible to a subsequent challenger, it provides an incentive to a
subsequent challenger to file an ANDA application and enter the market.
B. A Proper Court Diagnosis System
[47] Congress should mandate the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in
analyzing reverse payments. This mandate would ensure that the courts
173

See id.

174

See id.
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have a uniform and proper analysis of reverse payments. It is important
that Congress provide this mandate to analyze anticompetitive agreement
that the first proposal does not prevent.
[48] The courts must look at the exclusionary scope of the patent before
making the determination of the anticompetitive nature of a reverse
payment agreement. 175 Courts must presume the patent is valid and
cannot discard its exclusivity. But a valid patent is far different than a
valid reverse payment agreement. A court must compare the patent’s
claims to that of the ANDA filer’s drug to determine whether drug falls
within the scope of the patent claims. If ANDA drug falls directly within
the scope of a valid patent claim then the reverse payment agreement has a
high likelihood of being a valid extension of the patent. If the ANDA
drug does not fall within the scope of a patent claim, then the reverse
payment has a low likelihood of being a valid extension of the patent. The
court then must weigh the strength and scope of the patent in with the
traditional antitrust analysis.
[49] It is critical that Congress establish a pass-through 180-day
exclusivity and mandate the Eleventh Circuit’s reverse payment analysis.
The pass-through exclusivity proposal ensures generic filers are
incentivized to challenge brand name patents encouraging competition in
the market and removing the drug approval bottleneck for future generics.
The pass-through exclusivity proposal prevents anticompetitive reverse
payments by removing the approval bottleneck. Under the new proposal,
if the first three generic challengers enter into reverse payments, then the
approval bottleneck is removed for all other generic companies.
[50] However, the pass-through proposal does not prevent all reverse
payment agreement. It only removes the 180-day exclusivity bottleneck to
reduce the number of reverse payment agreements that are
anticompetitive. In order to discourage anticompetitive reverse payments
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that the pass-through proposal fails to prevent, Congress must mandate the
analysis set forth by the Eleventh Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
[51] Encouraging innovation over competition provides more value to
society than the other way around. Both are important and so Congress
must implement a proper balance to ensure one does not overwhelm the
other. Congress attempted to implement a balance between competition
and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 176 Congress rewarded the first generic with a 180-day exclusivity to
obtain a first mover advantage. 177 But Congress drafted the generic
exclusivity legislation in a way that harmed the subsequent generic filer
from competition. The first generic filer to challenge the patent holder
could enter into an agreement and not trigger its 180-day exclusivity. 178
Until the challenger triggered the exclusivity by marketing the drug, a
subsequent filer could not gain approval from the FDA to market its own
version. 179 Forcing the first generic challenger to pass the exclusivity
right to the next generic challenger increases competition and provides the
second generic challenger with greater incentive to make the drug. The
most important change Congress can make is to remove the generic
exclusivity bottleneck through a legislative amendment to prevent
companies from forming reverse payment agreements that are
anticompetitive. Secondly, Congress needs to mandate the Eleventh’s
Circuit approach in analyzing whether reverse payment agreements are
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anticompetitive to analyze reverse payment agreements that the first
proposal fails to prevent.

32

